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University of Illinois at Chicago
I just published a little pamphlet, in a new series from the University of Chicago
Press, Prickly Paradigm Pamphlets, called The Secret Sins of Economics. The pam-
phlet is directed at people outside economics, such as anthropologists and English
professors. As to its theme, if you’ve made a habit of reading my columns in the East-
ern you get only one guess.
Yup: economics, especially mainstream American economics, for all its promise,
is in very bad shape because it has fallen into a cargo-cult version of “science” in which
qualitative theorem-making runs the “theory” and statistical significance without a
loss function runs the “empirical work.” Consequently, none of the high-prestige “work”
in the journals is to be taken seriously. Most (say 95 percent) of its alleged “results”
have to be done all over again, by economic scientists using—in preference to the
mumbo-jumbo that has passed for scientific method among economists since 1947—
real scientific methods (such as serious simulation disciplined by the world’s facts;
and functional-form math; and statistical significance, when relevant, with loss func-
tions; and economic history; and inquiry into all the other human sciences we econo-
mists have been invited so long to ignore).
If on the other hand you have not made a habit of reading these columns . . . well.
. . I have a suggestion for your ethical and scientific education. Lacking it, you will
need a little explanation. I have given it in fuller form here and elsewhere (as in The
Secret Sins of Economics and in How To Be Human* *Though an Economist) over
and over and over again. Check it out at www.uic.edu/~deirdre2.
Here’s the nub. A real science—or a real inquiry into anything about the actual
world—should both think and watch, theorize and observe. That doesn’t mean that
pure thinking (philosophy or mathematics, for example) or pure watching (painting
and narrative, for example) are to be disdained. It just means that a science—or any
inquiry into the world, such as an inquiry into whether your lover will leave you if you
forget his or her birthday again—does both. The inquiry into your lover’s behavior
will only be of value, of course, if it is quantitative: it’s no use “proving” or “determin-
ing by testing at the 5 percent level” that the lover will be somewhat annoyed by the
forgotten birthday, to some indeterminate degree; you need to know how much. “Oh,
don’t worry, dear: I know you love me” is very different, quantitatively, from “You
jerk: that’s the last straw.” So: a real science (I am not distinguishing “science” from426 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
numerous other inquiries into the world, you see) is quantitative. All that’s obvious,
right?
To which the typical modern American economist will reply: “Great, Deirdre. I
agree. It is obvious. And that’s exactly what we mainstream economists do! We theo-
rize and observe, and at a wonderfully high level of both. We do very sophisticated
mathematical theorizing, such as in the Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green textbook
[1995], and then we test the theory in the world using very tricky econometrics, such
as Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data [2002].
You can see the results in any journal of economics. Some of it is pure and applied
theory, some theoretical and applied econometrics. Theorize and observe.”
To which I say: Bosh. She and her colleagues, when they are being most highbrow
and Science-proud, don’t really do either theorizing or observing. Economics in its
most prestigious and academically published versions engages in two activities, quali-
tative theorems without entries for the world’s data and statistical significance with-
out loss functions. These two look like theorizing and observing, and have the same
tough math and tough statistics that actual theorizing and actual observing would
have. But neither of them is what it claims to be. Qualitative theorems are not theoriz-
ing in a sense that would have to do with a double-virtued inquiry into the world. In
the same sense, statistical significance without a loss function is not observing.
Paul Samuelson, in his modestly entitled Ph. D. dissertation, The Foundations of
Economic Analysis (completed in 1941, published in 1947), told us we could get along
in economics on qualitative theorems. This was good news, since economics since
1747 had been mainly engaging in such “work.” The free trade theorem of Ricardo, for
example, has no places for filling in actual numbers you could actually go and mea-
sure in the world (though of course the substantive argument can with a good deal of
pushing and shoving be given a scientific and quantitative form, in simulations with
real facts, for which see economic historians: I’m talking about Ricardo’s actual book).
Neither did Samuelson’s factor-price equalization theorem give us a way of plugging
in actual numbers. And have you ever asked how you might simulate for the world’s
work a Max U model with overlapping generations? So economists, such as Paul’s
brother-in-law Ken Arrow, happily went on doing—now in a “rigorous” mathematical
version—the blackboard theorizing we economists had always loved.
So what?
This: It ain’t science. It’s just logic. It connects assumption A with conclusions C.
My objection to spending half of the working hours and journal space on such exer-
cises is not the same as being “against math” or “against theorizing.” It is being against
vapid existence theorems, whether mathematically or verbally expressed. Existence
is never a scientific issue, yet both of the Two Sins focus on the existence of an effect.
The trouble with qualitative theorems is that you can of course wander if you will
through the hyperspace of assumptions and corresponding conclusions until the cows
come home (as we do over and over again in every field of economics: witness trade
theory since Hume; or the ebbs and flows of this or that assumption in macro; or
Industrial Organization reduced to endless game-theoretic speculations). Yet you
haven’t said anything about the world unless you can measure. Make thus-and-such
assumptions, A, about the following game-theoretic model and you can show that a427 OTHER THINGS EQUAL
group of unsocialized individuals will form a civil society. Make another set of as-
sumptions, A', and they won’t. And so on and so forth. Blah, blah, blah, blah, to no
scientific end. (This particular branch of speculation has been growing since Thomas
Hobbes in the late 17th century; it has not come to a single factually correct conclusion
about the world, not yet.)
Such stuff is not theory in the sense used by, say, physics (or astronomy or geol-
ogy: the issue is not experimental vs. observational sciences). Pick up a copy of the
Physical Review (it comes in four versions; pick any). Open it at random. You will find
mind-breakingly difficult math, and physics that no one except a specialist in the
particular tiny field can follow. But always, in virtually every paragraph, you will
find repeated, persistent attempts to answer the question How Much. Go ahead: actu-
ally do it. Economists would stop saying that the current “theory” and “observation”
used in their field was a social physics if they actually bothered to look in on what
physicists do. Don’t worry; it doesn’t matter that you can’t understand the physics.
You will see that the physicists always use a rhetoric of How Much—not the question
we ask mathematically after Samuelson (and asked verbally before), Whether. The
physicists never prove theorems of the qualitative, existence-theorem sort beloved of
mathematicians (and post-Samuelson economists). All the hard math in physics is for
derivations, getting from one functional form to some another form easier to check
quantitatively. No physicist asks Whether an equilibrium “exists” or is “stable,” the
questions Samuelson and Arrow taught us to ask. The physicists calculate. Even the
theorists as against the experimenters in physics spend their days trying to figure out
ways of calculating magnitudes (consult Richard Feynman’s elementary lectures to
the Cal Tech undergrads for repeated showings that Math-Department intellectual
values are of no interest to physicists). The giveaway that something other than sci-
ence is going on in “theoretical” economics (and in math itself and in philosophy and,
alas, in political science and sociology, those econowannabe fields) is that such an
article contains not, from beginning to end, a single attempt at a magnitude.
“No worries,” says the Mainstream Economist, “We do econometric testing for fit
when we need magnitudes.”
Give me a break. No one, including you, disagrees that not every statistically
significant coefficient (or a high fit by any measure: insert here the latest vanity-
named test in time series econometrics) is scientifically significant. Further, no one
disagrees that some scientifically significant coefficients are not statistically signifi-
cant.
All right. You like logic? Apply it. You’ve just admitted that statistical signifi-
cance without a loss function (I didn’t say “statistics” tout court) is neither necessary
nor sufficient for scientific significance. Case closed.
You want observation? Go back to that copy of The Physical Review. I’ll give you
a nice, shiny euro if you can find a single instance in which statistical significance
without a loss function is used in physics. Or if you wish, examine, as my students at
UIC did last year, a big sample of articles in the magazine Science and discover for
yourself that statistical significance is used in the idiotic way it is used in economics
only in some few fields—meteorology, sometimes, and in parts of biology, population
biology for example (the population biologists are also in love with qualitative theo-428 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
rems, by the way: look no further for an explanation of the current hot romance be-
tween economics and evolutionary theory). Or on the economic side look into the AER
in the 1980s, as Steve Ziliak and I did in a JEL article in 1996, and note that 70
percent of the empirical papers use only statistical significance to judge whether a
coefficient is large or small (Steve has started our second paper, for the 1990s, and
tells me that it’s gotten . . . worse).
I am so tired of making these points. I am sure you are tired of me making them.
But are you a serious scientist? OK, then: do you have a reply to either of them? If you
think you do, publish it and send me a copy. In twenty years of making the two points
with gradually increasing clarity I’ve not encountered a reasonable, or even logically
coherent, reply to either. I have discussed them with some of the best economists in
the world: no reply. If you don’t have a reply, why do you go on committing what you
admit are sins against real science?
What’s going on? Maybe this: most scientists, like most people, don’t want to change
their minds, ever, about anything. They think it is undignified or something. I’ve
never understood this, why people want to act like what Harry Truman defined as an
Expert: “An Expert is someone who doesn’t want to learn anything new, because then
he wouldn’t be an expert.” It’s true of all fields, of physics, of history, of geology, of
literary criticism, of every science. We all, we mainstream economists, were trained
in the two techniques, which came out in the 1940s. By now everyone in mainstream
economics uses them. We must be right.
I’ve got a rhetorical proposal for breaking out of the mindset. It is to start calling
the two techniques something other than “mainstream” economics. We need a name
for the cargo cult in which so many of us were brought up. The cult can then be
examined side by side, fairly, with other approaches to economics, such as Austrian
economics or Marxist economics or institutional economics or the one I prefer, Scien-
tific Economics Actually Researching the Causes of Happenings (SEARCH). As long
as we call what fills up the AER and JPE, not to mention JET and Econometrica, just
“the mainstream” the natural human tendency to float down the lazy river/ In the
noonday sun will be irresistible. (Incidentally, European economics departments are
becoming increasingly Americanized, leaping into the lazy, lazy river/ You can loaf
along on the amazing argument that the leap will “raise scientific standards”; good
Lord).
I propose the term “Samuelsonian.” I was talking the other day in Rotterdam to
Mark Blaug, that very learned and insightful historian of economic thought, and he
agreed that Samuelson can fairly be blamed for the sin of qualitative theorems (Mark
has a recent paper in which he details the Formalist Revolution of the 1950s). He was
surprised to learn, however, that Samuelson, who has never done any empirical work,
can also be blamed—at least as an initial and important cause—for the sin of statisti-
cal significance without loss functions. As I have explained (for example, in The Vices
of Economists, The Virtues of the Bourgeoisie [1996]), Samuelson’s first Ph.D. stu-
dent, in the early 1940s, was Lawrence Klein, and the supervisor suggested to Klein
that he do a Tinbergen-type study of the American economy, using statistical signifi-
cance as the criterion for the “importance” of, say, interest rates in determining invest-
ment expenditure.429 OTHER THINGS EQUAL
Two sins, one scientist. It’s only fair to call the method of modern American eco-
nomics “Samuelsonian.” I mean, if he is going to get credit for this stuff he’s also got to
get the blame, too. (Modern economics could alternatively be called “Friedmanite,”
but Samuelson was advocating long before Friedman the same naïve logical positiv-
ism that economists associate with Friedman—incorrectly, in view of Friedman’s rich
and sophisticated empirical work such as The Monetary History of the United States).
Everyone agrees that Samuelson is a very nice guy, ethical, upright, warm. We
have been very lucky in economics to have such a person as our Great MIT Leader.
Believe me: linguistics has Noam Chomsky as its Great MIT Leader, and the results
(the dogmatic refusal to admit pragmatic considerations into linguistics, for example;
accompanied, I am told, by nasty personal behavior in aid of his ideas) has been bad
for that science; linguistics programs are closing all over the United States. And you
and I can agree as expert economists that Samuelson is a very great economic scien-
tist, and that there was nothing at all unnatural about him being the third person to
receive the Nobel (Tinbergen being the first).
So I’m not dissing Samuelson. But he would be the first to emphasize that we
must consider not only honorable intentions but unintended consequences.
Let me give an example, in the career of Paul’s friend and colleague and follower
and defender, another very nice person and Great MIT Leader, Bob Solow. I am not
dissing Solow, either. He too is a famously nice guy. He has been generous in his
praise of my work, as of other work, such as feminist economics, with which he does
not entirely agree. He’s a prince. But he, too, would want to be judged by high stan-
dards as an economic scientist.
You may be surprised to learn that Solow’s Ph. D. dissertation was empirical. One
piece of work after it for which he is well known is his brilliant article in 1957 offering
a way to measure “technological change.” That was real science. It gave some math—
“advanced” by the sorry mathematical standards of economics in 1957—that exhib-
ited a functional form that allowed one to separate the contribution of investment
from the contribution of technology to rises in output per person. In the article he
went on to a simulation with real data and drew real historical conclusions, carefully
examined (the theory took only a few paragraphs, and no proofs: just derivations in
the spirit of physics). It was the framework for my own Ph.D. work a decade later, and
for that of numerous other economic scientists interested in the actual world, such as
Edward Denison, among the best applied economists of his generation, and Zvi
Griliches, ditto, and Bob Gordon, ditto.
But then Solow went dramatically, Samuelsonianly wrong. He abandoned seri-
ous empirical inquiries into the world and started to do, among various other purely
Samuelsonian projects, growth “theory,” for which unhappily the Nobel committee
cited him. (I’m not unhappy about him getting the prize: I’m saying that in a properly
functioning science he would have gotten it for the technological change article.) Growth
“theory” is not, the way it is usually practiced, like “theory” in physics. Like many
economic ideas it can be brought to the actual world and confronted in actual func-
tional forms: Bob Barro’s text is a case in point (Barro was a Cal Tech undergrad, and
didn’t ever entirely lose the physicist’s sense—maybe he learned it from Feynman—
that Proof is trivial and that Simulation is not). But most growth “theory” is just430 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
drivel, just logic, just one damned assumption after another with no attempt to an-
swer the only scientific question, How Big.
Solow has gone on to more Samuelsonian economics. He fairly recently did a theory
book with Frank Hahn that’s got all the very great intelligence of these two men in it,
but amounts to chess problems relative to any actual scientific use. What is worse,
Solow’s generation, and Solow himself as a great teacher and public figure in the
field, educated and then hired people of my generation, and then of my students’
generation, doing more and more refined Samuelsonian drivel in theory and more
and more maniacal Samuelsonian misuses of statistical testing.
So: we need to start calling it Samuelsonian, not “neoclassical” or “mainstream”
or any of the terms that give away the game before it’s well started. The Samuelsonians
are to be distinguished from the empirical if non-econometric Marshallians like Ronald
Coase. Or with the empirical and econometric Economic Historians like Robert Fogel.
Or with the empirical and mathematical Neo-Marxists like Sam Bowles (though they
have sometimes fallen for Samuelsonianism). By contrast with these more scientific
versions of economics, the Samuelsonian school of economics, in which I was trained,
has left its scientific common sense behind—not because it overemphasizes Prudence
as against other springs of action (it does) or imperfectly admires capitalism (it does).
But because it indulges in the Two Secret Sins. We need to get beyond the Age of
Samuelsonianism in economics, and get back to SEARCHing.
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